EU Tech Sovereignty Package and the Dutch real case
By Anna Pillakouri, Corporate Lawyer
In a global environment marked by geopolitical uncertainty, dependencies on external factors are increasingly being weaponised. At the same time, rapid technological developments are reshaping the global landscape. As a result, it is essential for Europe to strengthen its control over its critical digital capabilities and enhance its technological sovereignty. As recently, highlighted by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen:
“We cannot afford to depend on others for the technologies that keep our hospitals running, our energy grids stable and our services secure. This is about protecting our citizens, defending our interests and making our own choices. Europe has the talent, the research excellence, the industrial base and the Single Market. Together, we must turn these strengths into technological sovereignty.”1
At present, the European Union relies on non-EU countries for more than 80% of key digital products, services, infrastructure, and intellectual property2. Reducing these dependencies is therefore vital for safeguarding Europe’s economic strength and security. In this context, strengthening technological sovereignty has become a key strategic objective for the European Union, enabling it to enhance its competitiveness, resilience, and strategic autonomy in an increasingly complex and rapidly evolving digital landscape.
Especially, the 2026 Commission Work Programme outlines the key strategies, action plans, and legislative initiatives that will shape the Union’s priorities for the coming period and contribute to the objective of building a strong, secure, and prosperous Europe. In this light, the European Commission proceeded with the formal presentation of its Tech Sovereignty Package on 3 of June. The package includes major digital infrastructure proposals, notably the Cloud and AI Development Act (CAIDA), aimed at expanding the development of European data centres and strengthening cloud and artificial intelligence capabilities within the Union. It is also including a new Chips Act 2, designed to further enhance semiconductor manufacturing capacity and attract strategic investment into the EU’s chip ecosystem3.
In addition, the package encompasses the EU Open-Source Strategy and the Strategic Roadmap for Digitalisation and Artificial intelligence (AI) in energy, which promote the adoption of open-source technologies and the digital transformation of key sectors, including the energy system, to support the EU’s competitiveness, resilience, and climate objectives.
Τhe Cloud and AI Development Act (CAIDA)
The European Union is promoting the Cloud and AI Development Act to strengthen its digital infrastructure and support the wider adoption of Artificial Intelligence (AI). The initiative aims to increase and facilitate the development of data centre capacity across Europe, support research and innovation in sustainable technologies, with a strong focus on highly sustainable and innovative facilities that can support both the green and digital transitions.
Further the Act establishes a common EU-wide framework to assess cloud and AI sovereignty while keeping most of the European market open to partners that share similar values and objectives. This framework will help protect critical applications and sensitive data, while supporting the development of advanced cloud and AI technologies.
The initiative will also promote a more coordinated approach to AI adoption across all Member States. Overall, the Act is designed to enhance Europe’s competitiveness, strengthen digital resilience, and accelerate its digital transformation4.
Τhe Chips Act 2
The European Union aims to strengthen its semiconductor industry through the Chips Act 2.0, recognising that semiconductors are essential for Artificial Intelligence and many technologies used in everyday life. Despite the fact the original Chips Act, introduced in 2023, helped address vulnerabilities in global supply chains, nevertheless Europe still depends heavily on non-EU countries for advanced chip production and design.
The new initiative seeks to build on Europe’s existing infrastructure and expand its capacity in advanced semiconductor technologies that support AI applications. It will accelerate permitting procedures, strengthen cooperation with trusted international partners, and introduce an excellence label for European semiconductor regions.
By adopting a more integrated ecosystem approach, the Act will bring chip manufacturers closer to key customers such as data centres, cloud providers, and AI Gigafactories. It will also encourage investment in strategic projects and help reduce risks, supporting Europe’s technological competitiveness and its ambitions in Artificial Intelligence5.
The EU Open-Source Strategy
The EU Open-Source Strategy6 promotes the development, adoption, and maintenance of open-source software to strengthen Europe’s digital sovereignty, reduce dependence on non-European proprietary technologies, improve cybersecurity, foster innovation, and enable public administrations to use interoperable and transparent digital solutions7.
In practical terms, the strategy encourages public administrations and businesses to adopt open-source solutions for areas such as cloud computing, artificial intelligence, digital identity, cybersecurity, and public digital services, while also supporting European open-source communities and developers.
Strategic Roadmap for Digitalisation and artificial intelligence (AI) in the energy sector
The Strategic Roadmap for Digitalisation8, published by the European Commission in June 2026, aims to increase the use of digital technologies and artificial intelligence to make Europe’s energy system more efficient, reliable, and sustainable. It focuses on improving electricity grids, increasing energy efficiency in buildings and industry, supporting renewable energy, managing the growing energy demand from data centres, and promoting secure data sharing and innovation to help achieve the EU’s climate and energy goals.
Delays on the formal presentation of Sovereignty Package
The Eu Sovereignty Package cause the concerns and the objection of existing non-EU partners. It should be mentioned that the formal presentation of the Tech Sovereignty Package followed a series of delays by the European Commission. Initially expected earlier in 2025, the package was postponed three times. The latest postponement came shortly after the remarksmade by the United States Ambassador to the European Union9. Specifically, he warned that rules of legislative sovereignty package could be perceived as “protectionist” and may pose a risk to EU-US trade deal. The Ambassador expressed concerns that the EU’s efforts to strengthen technological sovereignty and reduce the competitiveness of US entities in Europe is a red line for US10.
Netherlands blocks the acquisition of critical service provider by US company
Although the Sovereignty package has not been fully implemented nevertheless, recent developments at national level illustrate the growing emphasis on digital sovereignty and the importance of public interest in the assessment of foreign investment. In particular, the Netherlands has recently blocked the acquisition of Solvinity, a critical service provider that delivers infrastructure supporting DigiD, the Dutch national digital identity system used by millions of citizens to access government services, including tax, pension, healthcare, and municipal systems by the U.S. company Kyndryl. The proposed acquisition by the U.S.-based company Kyndryl would have resulted in a key provider of critical digital infrastructure coming under the control of a non-EU entity. The Dutch authorities ultimately prohibited the transaction on grounds of public interest and national security.
The decision, made following advice from the Dutch Investment Screening Bureau (BTI) and marked as the first time the Netherlands has prohibited a foreign acquisition since the establishment of its foreign investment screening mechanism. The government imposed a full prohibition on the acquisition rather than conditional approval, on the ground of public interest and national security concerns11.
A key factor in the decision was the perceived geopolitical and legal risk associated with U.S. law jurisdiction, particularly the CLOUD Act, as well as other U.S. legal instruments. These legal frameworks could, in theory, allow U.S. authorities to access data processed by U.S. owned company even when stored on European servers. Further concerns were raised about the continuity of DigiD services in the event of U.S. sanctions or restrictions on American technology providers operating in the Netherlands. Such developments could potentially disrupt the delivery of critical digital government services and affect Dutch citizens’ access to those services12.
At the same time, Dutch authorities were careful to emphasise that the decision was not directed against any specific country. Specifically, Willemijn Aerdts, Minister for the Digital Economy and Sovereignty, clarified that the BTI’s assessment was country-neutral, risk-based, and proportionate. As she noted, “The Netherlands values the presence of foreign technology companies, including American ones in particular, and their contribution to the Dutch economy and digital infrastructure.”13 This statement underscores that the prohibition was driven by concerns relating to the protection of critical digital infrastructure and essential public services rather than by economic nationalism or discrimination against foreign investment.14
The case reflects a broader European trend toward strengthening digital sovereignty, with EU Member States seeking to retain control over critical digital infrastructure, data, and cloud services. This approach aims to reduce strategic dependencies on non-EU actors in sectors closely linked to public administration, data security, and essential digital services.
Practical considerations connected with EU Sovereignty Package
The main challenge of introducing the EU Sovereignty Package is finding the right balance between achieving greater European digital autonomy and maintaining an open, competitive market. This is particularly important in relation to countries such as the United States, which have advanced technological expertise, innovation capacity, and specialized knowledge that can contribute to the creation and development of European digital infrastructures.
The European Commission and Member States should therefore implement the sovereignty package in a proportionate and flexible manner, ensuring that efforts to build European technological sovereignty do not unintentionally restrict cooperation, investment, or innovation. A balanced approach should encourage European capabilities while continuing constructive engagement with trusted international partners.
In this context, cooperation among the Member States of the European Union is essential to defining a common framework for the implementation of the EU Sovereignty Package. Such a framework should establish shared concepts, principles, and governance mechanisms that enable coordinated action across the Union. It should also create common forums for cooperation, the exchange of best practices, and the development of common reference standards, thereby ensuring a consistent and effective approach to the implementation of the initiatives included in the EU Sovereignty Package.
Through open dialogue and continuous assessment of new challenges, the proposed framework can be adapted to changing technological, economic, and geopolitical conditions. The success of the EU’s digital sovereignty strategy will ultimately depend on its ability to combine resilience and strategic autonomy with openness, collaboration, and technological cooperation within the European Union, while continuing to engage constructively with trusted international partners.
- 1.https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/commission-proposes-tech-sovereignty-package-strengthen-europes-digital-autonomy-and-resilience ↩︎
- 2.relies on non-EU countries for over 80% of key digital products, services, infrastructure, and intellectual property https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-tech-sovereignty ↩︎
- 3.https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/commission-proposes-tech-sovereignty-package-strengthen-europes-digital-autonomy-and-resilience ↩︎
- 4. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_26_1187s ↩︎
- 5. https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/strategy-documents/commission-work programme/commission-work-programme-2026_en#documents ↩︎
- 6.An open-source system is a software system whose source code is publicly available for anyone to inspect, use, modify, and redistribute under an open-source licence. Unlike proprietary software, where the source code is controlled by a single company, open-source software is developed collaboratively by communities, organizations, or companies. ↩︎
- 7.https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/open-source-strategy ↩︎
- 8.https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/eus-energy-system/digitalisation-energy-system_en#strategic-roadmap-for-digitalisation-and-ai-in-energy ↩︎
- 9.https://www.euractiv.com/news/eus-tech-sovereignty-package-delayed-for-third-time/ ↩︎
- 10.https://www.euractiv.com/news/eus-tech-sovereignty-plan-risks-trade-deal-warns-us-ambassador/ ↩︎
- 11.https://www.reuters.com/technology/dutch-government-block-takeover-cloud-services-company-solvinity-by-us-based-2026-05-26/ ↩︎
- https://www.taylorwessing.com/en/insights-and-events/insights/2026/04/the-potential-acquisition-of-solvinity-by-a-us-entity ↩︎
- 13. https://www.government.nl/government/members-of-cabinet/willemijn-aerdts?utm_source ↩︎
- 14.https://www.dutchnews.nl/2026/05/dutch-government-blocks-sale-of-digid-owner-to-us-tech-giant/ ↩︎
